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Housing and Its Influence on the Development of Social  
Inequalities in the Post-Communist Czech Republic 
 
TOMÁŠ KOSTELECKÝ* 
Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague 
Abstract: The article deals with the development of the housing market and its in-
fluence on the development of social inequalities in the post-communist Czech Re-
public. It originated within the framework of the project ‘The Housing Market, its 
Regional Differentiation and Social Circumstances’, sponsored by the Grant Agency 
of the Czech Republic. The different position of households in the housing market is 
understood not only as a consequence of social inequalities but also as an important 
source of them. The paper identifies two basic features of housing market develop-
ment that have profoundly influenced social inequalities in the Czech Republic in 
the 1990s: the large and rapid increase of regional differences in market prices, and 
the division of the housing market into several sectors operating under different le-
gal and financial conditions. Special attention is paid to the situation of households 
renting at market prices and the consequences of the privatisation of municipal 
houses. 
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The study of housing has been attracting the attention of social scientists for many years. 
Research has predominantly focused on the failures in housing, and there have been three 
traditional spheres of interest: the overcrowding of flats, the poor sanitation of flats, and 
the lack of flats [Kemeny 1992]. In connection with post-war economic development in 
Western Europe and North America, interest in the first two research themes mentioned 
here has declined and attention has become focused predominantly on the broader socio-
economic context of housing. In 1967, Rex and Moore [1967] published the book Race, 
Community and Conflict, which introduced the concept of ‘housing classes’ into the the-
ory. The authors, inspired by Marxist class theory, studied the functioning of the individ-
ual segments of the housing markets and the behaviour of the actors in these markets. 
They attempted to prove that unequal access to housing is gradually becoming a mecha-
nism through which the ruling class tries to preserve its economic dominance. In the de-
bate initiated on the publication of this book, the views of adherents of the ‘housing 
classes’ theory, who were from among the Marxists [e.g. Castels 1977], clashed with the 
views of adversaries of this theory, who were from among the neo-Weberians [e.g. 
Dunleavy 1981], and who saw the inequalities in the housing market as predominantly a 
result of the different power positions of individual social groups and influential indi-
viduals. Regardless of the attitude towards the conclusions of the work of Rex and 
Moore, the basic idea of their book – that inequalities in the housing market are worth 
studying when one is trying to understand social inequalities – has been generally ac-
cepted. 
However, the relationship between housing inequalities and social inequalities in 
general can be seen from radically different positions. On the one hand, inequalities in 
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housing are interpreted as a ‘product’ of the inequalities in household incomes (the higher 
the income, the better the position in the housing market). On the other hand, housing 
inequalities can be understood as one of the sources of social inequalities. Some authors 
even consider, in the context of western post-industrial society, privileges in access to 
housing and the different position towards the individual segments of the housing market 
as the main factors which determine social inequalities [e.g. Saunders 1978]. 
It is not possible to generally decide which approach mentioned above is ‘the right 
one’, as the relationship between social inequalities and housing essentially depends on 
the specific situation in each society studied, and in particular the way the individual 
housing markets function. The situation in the post-communist Czech Republic is even 
more complicated by the widespread presence of status inconsistency among both indi-
viduals and households [Machonin, Tuček et al. 1996]. During communist rule, there 
were many people with a high level of education and a low income, and people with low 
employment status and a high income etc. Similarly, the mutual relation between a 
household’s income and wealth (as measured either by the possession of valuables or the 
value of real estate) was typically weak under the communist regime [Večerník 1997: 
106]. The same was true for the relation between household income and housing. In this 
article, we start with the hypothesis that inequalities in the housing market, partly inher-
ited and partly generated by post-communist development in the Czech Republic, form 
one of the most important sources of social inequalities. 
Before the results of the analysis will be presented it is necessary to make a short 
excursion into the history of housing in the Czech Republic, and to describe in brief the 
changes on the housing market after the fall of communism. Under the communist re-
gime, development of housing was subject to the tight control of the state. All privately 
owned housing stock was nationalised (with the exception of family houses), and most 
new housing construction was either directly planned or strictly controlled by the state 
authority. Housing co-operatives fell under the state administration, rents were subject to 
state regulation, market prices in housing were abolished and substituted with ‘adminis-
trative’ prices. From the legal point of view, four statuses with regard to housing were 
dominant. There were state-owned blocks of flats, blocks of flats owned by different 
(state) companies, co-operative blocks of flats, and privately owned family homes. The 
state flats used to be assigned to applicants from a waiting list, and the company flats 
were assigned to company employees. Residents of both state and company flats had 
neither ownership rights nor duties, but they had a ‘decree’ claiming their right to stay in 
the flat as tenants for an ‘unlimited time’, and furthermore, they had automatic right to 
transfer the ‘decree rights’ to their children. Both state and company flats were provided 
to applicants for free on the basis of need and availability. Usually the rents did not even 
cover the maintenance costs. Given for free (if corruption practices are not taken into 
account), the state and company flats had officially a zero market price. Due to the long-
term housing shortage, however, ‘possession of a decree’ itself has become tradable 
property, and many ways, both the semi-legal and illegal ‘sale or purchase of’ a state or 
company flat (that is a decree) have developed over time. 
Co-operative housing, which had even a pre-communist tradition in the Czech 
lands, was based on the idea of ‘collective self-help’ of the members of housing co-
operatives. Each citizen could become a member of one of the co-operatives by paying a 
membership fee. Although the construction of co-operative houses was partly subsidised 
by the state, residents of co-operative houses had to cover a substantial part of construc-
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tion costs (in some cases simply by paying the money, in other cases through unpaid 
work during the construction of the houses). The rents paid by tenants in co-operative 
flats had to fully cover the maintenance costs, and also included the repayment of state 
loans. It was legally possible to buy membership in the co-operative, and thus to gain the 
right to use a co-operative flat. In reality, the real prices in such deals greatly exceeded 
the membership fees, since they included an unofficial ‘bonus’ calculated on market prin-
ciples of supply and demand. 
The last legal status on the housing market during communism was represented by 
privately owned family houses, in which the residents were also the owners. Although 
this sector was formerly considered to be only a residue of the pre-communist period, as 
the incapability of the state to fulfil people’s housing needs was more evident, the regime 
cautiously allowed people to built their own houses. Later, self-construction of family 
houses was even partially supported through cheaper loans or subsidies. Despite this fact, 
however, the owners of family houses had to finance the construction (either mostly or 
completely) and pay all maintenance costs. It was possible to buy or sell a house for an 
official ‘valuation price’, but in practice market prices were used, including an unofficial 
extra bonus. 
Since the fall of the communist regime, several important changes in the field of 
housing have been observable. The termination of state-financed housing construction, 
combined with the decrease in real wages, brought about a deep decline in housing con-
struction after 1991. This fact is evident from the figures showing the number of apart-
ment constructions initiated, which was typically in between 55 and 60 thousand annually 
up until 1990, and which dropped to only 10,899 in 1991, 8429 in 1992 and even to 7454 
in 1993 [for detailed information see Andrle 1994 and Andrle and Vlášek 1998]. At the 
same time, the rapid development of new private companies highly increased the pressure 
to change flats into offices and, especially in the most attractive cities, like Prague or 
Karlovy Vary, a considerable number of foreigners entered into the demand side of local 
housing markets. All this, together with the increasing need of housing for newly emerg-
ing families founded by young people born during the population boom in the 1970s, 
resulted in a sharp increase in prices. 
Although some changes on the housing market affected everybody, some devel-
opment was specific to individual sectors of the housing market. Many state-owned 
blocks of flats have been returned to the previous owners or their descendants, while the 
majority of the remainder has been transferred from state to municipal ownership. An 
overwhelming majority of company houses have been sold to private owners in the proc-
ess of privatisation, together with factories. Thus the sectors of private and municipal 
rental houses have come into existence, while company-owned housing has practically 
ceased to exist, and the scope of state-owned housing has been substantially reduced. 
Later, some municipal houses were sold to companies or co-operatives made up of ten-
ants, or individual flats were sold directly to tenants. However, despite the substantial 
shifts in the ownership structure and the many changes to legislature, the basic principles 
of the housing market functioning in post-communist Czech Republic remain rather simi-
lar to those used in the communist period. In an effort to maintain social peace and to 
help families to survive the first phases of economic reforms, the government has decided 
to maintain the system of state regulation of rents, not only in municipal flats but also in 
houses returned to their former owners. Thus the change of ownership did not affect the 
status of tenants living in the flats at the time of the change in ownership, as far as the 
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rent they have to pay is concerned. Consequently, the ‘possession of a decree’ has re-
mained transferable to family members, exchangeable with some other ‘owner of a de-
cree’ and, of course, tradable on the black market. In addition to the above mentioned 
sector of the rental housing market which has remained under careful state control, a quite 
new sector of rental housing based on free market principles has been gradually develop-
ing. The legislature allowed for setting up market rents if the tenant was not a citizen of 
the Czech Republic, if the flat had been vacant prior to renting (this does not apply to the 
exchange of flats) or if a privately owned family house was being rented. Moreover, due 
to the fact that there was basically no price regulation on sublease contracts, a growing 
number of people had the status of ‘subtenants’ and paid a market rent while living in 
flats of various ownership types. 
Methodological Remarks 
The methodology of the research follows the idea that the key information necessary for 
understanding the role housing plays in the development of social inequalities in the post-
communist Czech Republic is information about prices. That is why the data from general 
statistics, even census data, could not be a main source of information, as official housing 
statistics focus on the physical aspect of housing (the size of the flats, technical stan-
dards…). Therefore, we have decided to conduct our own field research to search for 
relevant information about the market prices of both rents and purchases. A network of 
co-operators from among university students was set up to cover all regions in the Czech 
Republic. We decided not to depend on the only source of information on prices in the 
housing market. On the contrary, we have tried to avoid any systematic bias by using 
diversified sources. Thus our basic source of information was of two types: newspaper 
advertisements and information collected and posted by local real estate companies. As 
far as advertisements in the press are concerned, a total of 23 different titles were ob-
served. Four of them (Mladá Fronta Dnes, Lidové noviny, Hospodářské noviny and Ze-
mědělské noviny) were national newspapers, and another eleven newspapers were the 
most relevant regional ones. The bulk of information, however, came from specialised 
‘advertisement newspapers’, of which three titles (Annonce, Inzert Express, Inzertspoj) 
have a dominant position in this respect. Most such advertisement newspapers use the 
same system of financing – the companies gain their income from those who buy the 
newspaper but not from those who advertise. From the point of view of our research, the 
particular advantage of this system lies in the easy access of potential advertisers to the 
newspaper and consequently the vast number of advertisements being published. The 
main disadvantage is the easy possibility of multiple advertising, and therefore the need 
for careful control of the data and the subsequent replacement of duplicated advertise-
ments. Data from all kinds of newspapers was collected every week for a period of six 
months. As for real estate companies, we identified several of the largest ones in each 
region (avoiding those mutually interconnected and thus presenting the same offers), and 
then we collected information on a month-to-month basis, also for a period of six months 
(September 1996-February 1997). 
Several different types of data have been obtained. We distinguished flats and fam-
ily houses, renting and sales, and supply and demand. Each of the particular data sets has 
a similar structure, which includes as many of the following as available: flat or house; 
locality (municipality and district); number of rooms; floor space (m2); legal status of the 
flat (house); purchase price (or monthly rent); the source of information (newspaper ad-
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vertisement or real estate company); month in which data were collected. In spite of the 
fact that the ‘offers’ in newspaper advertisements or real estate agencies are generally 
more specific than the ‘demands’ (and consequently files with data about flats or houses 
on offer contain more information), it seems useful to maintain the same structure for 
both types of files. It allows for merging files for some specific purposes, such as analys-
ing price levels (we believe that real prices lie somewhere between the prices asked by 
owners and the prices offered by buyers/tenants). 
The problem of the representativeness of the obtained data must also be mentioned 
here. Theoretically, the best option would be to collect all information about both supply 
and demand on the respective housing markets available to the public, that is to record all 
individual advertisements in the newspapers as well as all offers made public by the real 
estate agencies in the respective regions. It is clear, however, that this goal is unrealistic – 
at least due to the limited financial resources and capacity of the research team. But the 
problem is that even the use of probability sampling is not possible, because there are 
many published advertisements containing either no or only a little specific information. 
To give an example, advertisements with texts such as ‘We want to buy a flat. Good 
price.’ or ‘Large co-operative flat for sale. Price negotiable.’ are generally not usable. 
That is why we have concentrated on recording advertisements that contained as much 
relevant information as possible. Therefore, strictly speaking, our data cannot be consid-
ered a statistically representative set describing ‘the complete supply and demand pre-
sented in newspaper advertisements and by real estate agencies’. Instead the data we have 
collected form a probability sample of those offers from newspaper advertisements and 
real estate agencies which contain enough specific information to be recorded. The char-
acter of the data should be taken into account as the sampling error cannot be calculated 
accurately. However, it should be noted that there is no way in which to obtain a data set 
that can be regarded as strictly representative from the statistical point of view. Moreover, 
the methods of the analysis of the data we have used in the article were not sensitive to 
sampling errors, and thus the results presented below are robust. Altogether, more than 
22,000 cases were collected. After the exclusion of duplicated records and logical control, 
21,688 cases remained (6503 records concerning rental housing, 8240 records concerning 
flat purchases and 6945 records concerning family house purchases). As all recorded data 
include information about the location of the estate (municipality, district, region) and the 
data from all 76 districts + Prague were collected, several different regional sortings 
could be carried out. The number of recorded cases were roughly proportional to the 
number of flats and houses in each particular region, with three exceptions: Prague and 
the North Moravian districts were over-represented in the data set, while districts in South 
Moravia were under-represented. In most analysis working with regional sub-samples, 
the division of the Czech Republic into 13 regions + Prague as a separate spatial unit was 
used, and in some cases a division into 76 districts + Prague was used. The regions corre-
spond to the administrative regions of the Czech Republic introduced in autumn 1997, 
while the districts correspond to administrative districts in effect from 1997. 
We then focused on the group that is the most threatened by housing problems –
newly-founded families [Matyáš 1994]. A short questionnaire was prepared in order to 
determine basic data on the social and economic structure of newly-founded families, 
their housing situation at the time of their marriage, and their strategy for the future. Data 
was collected for a period of six months (June 1997-November 1997) with the assistance 
of clerks in selected register offices (The register office is where anyone wishing to be 
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married is obliged to fill in statistical forms necessary for the official registration of the 
marriage.). The sample of register offices covered all regions as well as all types of mu-
nicipalities. Every couple appearing at the selected register offices who met the selection 
criteria (age of both under 35 years, first marriage for both) was asked to fill the ques-
tionnaire – brides and bridegrooms separately. In the end a total of 1966 completed ques-
tionnaires were gathered, representing around 7% of the couples married during that time 
period throughout the entire country. 
Social Inequalities Generated by the Housing Market 
One of the characteristic features of the transformation of post-communist societies is the 
increase of inequalities among individuals, households, social groups, and territorially 
defined units – towns, districts, regions [Večerník 1992, 1997; Matějů 1993; Machonin, 
Tuček et al. 1996; Kostelecký 1994, 1995]. The inequalities mentioned above have vari-
ous causes, manifold features and different consequences. It is important to note, how-
ever, that some are ‘generated directly’ while others are partially influenced by the 
position of particular individuals or households in the housing market. In the search for 
characteristics of the housing market which have an influence on social inequalities, sev-
eral such attributes can be identified. The first one is the division of the housing market 
into regional and local markets that function to some extent autonomously [Kemeny 
1992]. The second concerns the division of the housing market into segments which may 
operate under different rules [Siksiö and Borgegard 1990]. The division into different 
segments also relates to the differences between the housing situation of ‘old’ house-
holds, which already lived in their flats or houses (either owned or rented) before the 
breakdown of communist rule, and new households, which have entered the housing 
market under new conditions, after the regime had changed. 
1. Regional inequalities 
The fact that there are substantial differences among various regions, cities and neigh-
bourhoods in respect to both the prices and the quality of housing is no surprise to anyone 
who lives in a country with a market economy. However, under the communists in the 
Czech Republic, planners intentionally diminished all types of regional differences, in-
cluding those concerning housing. The idea of regional equality and strict control over the 
trade in real estate, combined with the authority of state administration over regional de-
velopment, resulted in a situation radically different from that in most Western countries. 
The overwhelming majority of state money intended for new housing went to district 
authorities, and consequently to the construction of blocks of flats in the district capitals 
(75 middle sized cities spread throughout the country). This housing policy more or less 
ignored smaller towns and villages, but at the same time suppressed the development of 
the biggest cities and metropolitan areas. The only exception from this rule was the 
strongly supported housing construction in ‘old industrial areas’ which had been founded 
on the coal mining, steel and chemical industries. Therefore, at the end of communist 
rule, the country inherited a settlement structure for which the following features were 
typical: no large metropolitan areas, limited sub-urbanisation, housing stock of a similar 
type and technical standard throughout all regions, little regional difference in the 
purchase price of flats, houses and land, and virtually no regional differences in rents. 
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The partial introduction of free-market principles into the housing sector at the be-
ginning of the economic transformation revealed huge differences among the regions (see 
Table 1). 
Table 1. Regional differences in the prices of flats (per 1 m2 of living space) in 
1996 – figures show the distribution of flats (in %) into price catego-
ries based on quintiles calculated on the country level 
Regions 1. quintile 2. quintile 3. quintile 4. quintile 5. quintile 
Praha 0.4 2.9 4.0 7.9 84.8 
Central Bohemia 1.2 18.3 23.8 40.4 16.3 
České Budějovice 12.1 29.5 26.8 19.7 11.8 
Plzeň 2.8 14.1 25.4 37.8 19.9 
Karlovy Vary 8.0 30.4 27.5 20.3 13.8 
Ústí nad Labem 89.2 9.8 0.9 0.0 0.2 
Liberec 22.6 25.6 32.3 13.1 6.4 
Hradec Králové 20.2 29.3 12.1 12.1 26.3 
Pardubice 2.4 11.8 23.6 38.7 23.5 
Jihlava 6.9 27.5 25.5 32.4 7.8 
Brno 2.6 11.8 23.7 34.6 27.2 
Olomouc 5.3 29.7 36.6 26.3 2.0 
Ostrava 55.8 31.1 8.8 2.6 1.7 
Zlín 3.4 12.1 20.9 36.9 26.7 
 
The Czech Republic 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 
Source: [Šetření… 1996]. 
 
The figures in Table 1 illustrate well the extent of price inequalities among different re-
gional housing markets. While in the entire sample 20% of the most expensive flats be-
long to the fifth quintile, in Prague almost 85% of flats belong to this category, and only 
0.4% of flats fit in the first – the cheapest – quintile. On the contrary, almost 90% of flats 
in the industrial region of Ústí nad Labem in North-Western Bohemia belong to the 
cheapest quintile, while there are practically no flats in the two most upper quintiles. An 
even higher level of price inequality among the regions was revealed when the prices of 
family houses were compared. Differences in market rents were slightly lower. 
It is important to mention that the ‘market evaluation’ of the housing in different 
regions does not simply trace inequalities in household incomes. It also includes the situa-
tion in the local labour market, perspectives of local economy, the traffic infrastructure, 
environmental conditions, the attractiveness of the region for foreigners, the positive or 
negative image of the place etc. In fact, the extent of price inequalities in different re-
gional housing markets highly exceeded that of household incomes, which were surpris-
ingly low (see Table 2). 
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Table 2. Regional differences in household incomes in 1996 – figures show the 
distribution of households (in %) into categories based on quintiles 
calculated on the country level 
Regions 1. quintile 2. quintile 3. quintile 4. quintile 5. quintile 
Praha 19.5 16.8 17.3 18.3 28.1 
Central Bohemia 20.1 21.0 18.6 20.6 19.7 
České Budějovice 18.3 20.5 21.2 20.7 19.3 
Plzeň 19.9 20.1 20.9 20.0 19.7 
Karlovy Vary 23.1 21.9 19.1 20.5 15.4 
Ústi nad Labem 22.8 20.6 20.5 18.3 17.8 
Liberec 22.5 19.4 19.2 20.6 18.3 
Hradec Králové 17.8 23.2 20.0 18.9 20.1 
Pardubice 19.3 20.7 22.8 20.7 16.5 
Jihlava 18.0 20.9 20.9 21.1 19.1 
Brno 19.5 19.5 19.2 21.0 20.8 
Olomouc 18.8 20.9 22.2 21.4 16.7 
Ostrava 20.9 20.7 21.5 20.0 16.9 
Zlín 19.8 18.0 20.2 20.2 21.8 
 
The Czech Republic 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 
Source: [Šetření… 1996, Příjmový… 1998]. 
 
The fact that a high level of regional inequality in the prices of housing contrasts with the 
relatively similar income structure of the households in individual regions has two oppo-
site consequences for the development of social inequalities. For those living in attractive 
regions, and who owned some real estate or co-operative flat, the rapid price growth in 
such areas meant high capital gains, and consequently an increase in the property value, 
both of which have nothing to do with the household members’ success or failure in the 
labour market. Conversely, those living in less favourable regions were suffering a rela-
tive loss. It should be stressed here that the capital gains mentioned above were high in 
comparison with household incomes. The average price of a one-bedroom flat of 57 m2 of 
living space in Prague in 1996 (1,019,331 CZK) represented 6.2th multiple of the annual 
net income of the average Czech household at that time, while the price of the same flat 
in the ‘cheapest district’, the city of Most in North-Western Bohemia, (154,755 CZK) 
was slightly less than what the average Czech household earned in one year. Similarly, 
the price of ‘tenants’ decrees’ as well as market rents in attractive regions became much 
higher than those in less attractive areas (even if controlled for regional differences in 
incomes). All this made moving from ‘cheap’ regions to ‘expensive’ ones more difficult 
than any time before. This can be well documented through statistical figures on migra-
tion which show that all of the most expensive districts (Prague, Brno, Plzeň, Zlín…) 
were losing their populations in spite of the high number of available jobs and the lowest 
rates of unemployment (for example 0.4% in Prague). The lowest prices in the housing 
market were typical for regions with the highest rate of unemployment [Heřmanová and 
Kostelecký 2000]: the highest unemployment rate was in the district of Most in 1996 
(9.4%), which had the lowest prices for flats. To live in such ‘low-price regions’ could be 
risky: anyone who lost their job (and the probability of losing one’s job was the highest in 
these regions) found themselves in a kind of a ‘social trap’. To find a new job in the re-
gion in which one lived was difficult due to the high unemployment rate, while to move 
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to some region with more jobs was difficult because of the cost of housing there. When 
pressed to choose between two ‘bad options’ – to stay at home on social benefits or to 
reduce one’s own housing standard while moving to regions with available jobs – most 
households elect to maintain their housing standard and not to move. 
The unequal real estate price increase has, of course, quite an inverse impact on the 
households that were established only once the new situation in the housing market was 
in effect. Thus the most serious problems with access to housing are felt by new house-
holds in the regions with the highest prices in housing in relation to the level of local in-
come. While not taking into account the possibility that new households received help 
from relatives, the easiest way for a new household to obtain its own housing was to rent 
a flat on the free market. The following table will illustrate the range of regional differ-
ences in access to housing by displaying ten districts with the easiest and ten districts 
with the most difficult access to housing on the free market. 
Table 3. Regional differences in access to housing on the free market in 1996 – 
figures show the number of m2 of living space which a local house-
hold with an average local income could afford to rent on the free 
market if paying 30% of its income on housing 
Districts with m2 of living Districts with the  m2 of living 
the easiest access space most difficult access space 
Litoměřice 80 Capital Prague 23 
Jeseník 79 Prague-East 30 
Karviná 78 Plzeň-South 31 
Hodonín* 77 Prague-West 33 
Nový Jičín 77 Brno-Countryside* 34 
Chomutov 72 Brno-City* 36 
Přerov 71 Karlovy Vary 37 
Most 71 Cheb 41 
Frýdek-Místek 66 Benešov 41 
Bruntál 66 Náchod 41 
*) Subject to high sampling error due to the low numbers of registered cases 
Source: [Šetření… 1996, Příjmový… 1998]. 
 
It is clear from the table that regional differences in access to housing on the free market 
are high. On one side of the scale there are districts with a rather favourable market-
rent/income ratio, allowing new local households with average incomes to rent a smaller 
or larger two-bedroom flat (from 66 to 80 m2) on the free market, while not spending all 
their money on housing. On the other side there are regions where new local households, 
paying the same share of their average income on housing, could hardly rent more than a 
studio with – or even without – a kitchen of merely 30-40 m2; in Prague the area was only 
23 m2. 
The fact that difficulties in the search for separate housing for new households de-
pend on the housing market situation in particular regions is documented by the results of 
a survey conducted among couples at the time of their marriage. As the number of ques-
tionnaires (N = 1966) received did not allow for working with too many regionally de-
fined sub-samples, we divided the questionnaires into three groups, defined by three 
different levels of the accessibility of housing measured by prices in housing / local in-
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comes ratio, and then statistically tested for whether the respondent’s answers depend on 
the housing situation in the regions where they live. As the answers of brides and bride-
grooms in regard to housing were rather similar, and moreover, as the overwhelming 
majority of them lived either together or in the same type of region prior to marriage, we 
will present only the answers of the bridegrooms (presented are only answers with statis-
tically significant differences at p < 0.01). It is evident from the data that the greater the 
problems with access to housing were, the greater the role of the extended family also 
was. In regions with the most difficult access to housing, 46.2% of respondents claim that 
“problems with housing will be solved with the help of the extended family”, while only 
38.7% did so in ‘average’ regions, and 32.6% in the regions with relatively the easiest 
access to housing. ‘Help from the extended family’ can take various forms: 12.6% of 
respondents living in regions with extensive housing problems wanted to borrow money 
from relatives, while only 7.4% of respondents living in regions with the easiest access to 
housing planned to do so. More often, help from the extended family simply means that a 
new family does not constitute a new household, but starts or continues to live with par-
ents. While in regions with the easiest access to housing 14.9% of new couples live to-
gether with the parents of either the bride or bridegroom, in areas with the greatest 
difficulty in access to housing the figure is 23.9%. Finally, it is not very surprising that 
the level of satisfaction with one’s own housing also depends on the situation in the local 
housing market. While 42% of couples in ‘regions with the least problems’ were satisfied 
with their housing, the same was true for only 33.5% of couples living in the ‘regions 
with the greatest problems’. 
2. Inequalities connected with the division of the housing market into segments 
The evolution of the housing market after the fall of communism resulted in the estab-
lishment of distinct segments which operate under different rules. Segments are defined 
both by the type of ownership and by how the housing expenditures (rent) are deter-
mined. It is possible distinguish five segments: 
a) Private flats and family houses occupied by owners 
b) Co-operative flats occupied by members of co-operatives 
c) Rental flats in public (municipal or state) ownership with regulated rents 
d) Rental flats in private ownership with regulated rents 
e) Rental flats of any ownership with market rents. 
The position of the household in a certain segment of the housing market influences three 
important things: the household property value, the structure of household expenditures 
(namely the share of housing expenditures) and how easy or difficult the household can 
alter its own position in the housing market. As far as household property value is con-
cerned, it is clear that the differences are huge. On one side of the scale there are house-
holds that own the flat or house in which they live, which of course represents the bulk of 
their total property. Households living in co-operative flats can sell their membership in 
the co-operative and, similarly to those living in rental flats with regulated rents, can (le-
gally, semi-legally or illegally) capitalise their tenant rights (specifically the possibility to 
pay less than the market rent). On the other side, households that live in rental flats with 
market rents cannot gain any money from selling ‘their housing’, as they possess neither 
real estate nor any tradable ‘tenant rights’. The following table shows the average cost of 
the flat in different market segments by regions. 
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Table 4. Price differences between flats of different ownership status in 1996 
by regions (family houses not included) – figures show the average 
purchase price per 1 m2 in CZK and private/rental flats price ratio  
in % by region 
  Flats  (Private/Rental) 
Region Private Co-operative Rental** ×100% 
Praha 21,240 16,974 9,972 213 
Central Bohemia 8,722 8,796 6,402 136 
České Budějovice 7,378 7,387 6,572* 112* 
Plzeň 10,362 8,586 5,997 173 
Karlovy Vary 9,191 7,221 4,202* 219* 
Ústí nad Labem 4,245 3,217 1,689 251 
Liberec 8,277 6,731 3,932 211 
Hradec Králové 9,463 8,104 4,590 206 
Pardubice 9,090 8,967 7,826 116 
Jihlava 8,424 7,853 8,383* 100* 
Brno 11,380 9,226 6,400 178 
Olomouc 8,862 8,060 4,891* 181* 
Ostrava 7,157 4,153 3,714 193 
Zlín 9,387 9,018 8,754* 107* 
*) Subject to high sampling error due to low frequencies in respective sub-categories. 
**) Category ‘Rental flats’ here refers to flats with regulated rents (state, municipal or 
owned by private landlord) 
Source: [Šetření… 1996]. 
 
In spite of remarkable regional differences, it is worth noting that the same logic is re-
vealed by the data from all regions. The most expensive are private flats, but the prices of 
co-operative flats are not much lower. The gap lies between co-operative and rental flats: 
the number of co-operative flats offered or demanded on the market is much higher than 
the number of rental flats and, even more important, their average purchase price is also 
substantially higher in most regions. Thus the diversified price increase of housing in the 
post-communist period favoured households living in privately owned flats and co-
operative flats, while households living in rental flats were at a disadvantage. Moreover, 
the large discrepancy between the ‘property value’ of flats of different ownership catego-
ries represents an important obstacle for households living in rental flats to move to an-
other flat of the same size. Its choice must either be limited only to other rental flats or to 
paying a considerable amount of money when moving is necessary. 
In the post-communist era, however, there were two possible mechanisms for ena-
bling a household to change their position in the housing market without moving from the 
flat it was living in: restitution and housing privatisation. Both of these procedures have 
their own winners and losers. In both cases, who the winner or the loser was has nothing 
or very little to do with household incomes or the success or failure of the individual 
household members in the labour market. For households living in state-owned flats that 
were returned to the former owners or their descendants, this change has some important 
consequences. Although rents remained controlled (and as a result housing expenditure 
does not differ from that of households living in public rental flats), the position of the 
household in the housing market became considerably worse, even when we assume that 
all landlord-tenant relations were correct, and both sides followed the laws and regula-
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tions. The danger emerged that a landlord might want to have the flat vacated and then 
use it for himself, members of his family, or rent it as an office at market prices. In spite 
of the fact that in this situation the landlord was required to provide tenants with a substi-
tute flat of adequate quality, moving to a substitute flat could mean a worsening of the 
housing standard of tenants, particularly as far as the location of the flat is concerned. To 
become a tenant in a privately owned flat even further reduced the number of options if 
such a household decided to move. The only legal, and the most frequently used, possibil-
ity for moving while maintaining the ‘right to regulated rent’ is the exchange of a flat 
with another household.1 As an overwhelming majority of households living in state or 
municipal owned flats, not to mention people living in co-operative flats, are reluctant to 
move to rental flats with a private landlord, only other flats with private landlords can be 
considered. The third, and most important, fact is that households which found them-
selves in the position of tenants in privately owned houses lost the chance to privatise the 
flats they were living in. 
This leads us to the second process in the housing market which could have a re-
markable influence on the household position within the social structure – the privatisa-
tion of municipal and state owned flats. There were many ways in which to privatise flats 
in public ownership, but despite the proper technique of privatisation, in the majority of 
cases the flats ended up in the hands of tenants. As the declared, prime objective of priva-
tisation was to remove the financial burden of maintaining housing stock from the mu-
nicipalities and to shift it to the future private owners, taking into account the low level of 
purchasing power of most households, municipalities sold the flats well below market 
price. In Prague, for example, flats were sold to tenants for about 2000 CZK per m2, and 
in smaller cities it was usually less. Commonly, only part of the total amount had to be 
paid immediately, while the rest could be paid later in instalments. Moreover, this ar-
rangement allowed some municipalities to let new owners deduct money they would 
spend on repairs and reconstruction from the purchase price. Regardless of whether the 
purchase price was high or low when compared with incomes and savings of the tenants, 
to sell flats for below-market prices means nothing less than capital gain being donated to 
new owners by the other taxpayers. The amount of the ‘granted money’ varies, depending 
on purchase price, the size of the flat, its quality and location. The capital gain of house-
holds having purchased an average, quality, two-bedroom flat, 77 m2 in area, for 2000 
CZK per m2, ranges between 0 and 230,000 CZK (if the average ‘price of a decree’ in the 
region is subtracted from the total gains). If the purchase price considered is 1000 CZK 
per m2, capital gains increase to about 20,000 to 300,000 CZK per household. In Prague, 
however, the figures are much higher: 710,000 and 790,000 CZK respectively. Even if 
the purchase price in Prague was set up to 3000 CZK, the capital gain was still over 
630,000 CZK, which represents a 3.3 multiple of the annual income of the average Pra-
gue family. How huge an amount of granted money that 630,000 CZK represents will be 
even clearer from the next example. Suppose that two average households are living in 
two identical 77 m2 flats in the same location, but in two different municipal houses. Flats 
in the first house are offered to tenants for 3000 CZK per m2, while the other house re-
mains in public ownership. As a result the ‘lucky’ household in the first flat becomes the 
                                                     
1) The exchange of flats itself is difficult, as the pairs of households interested in each other’s flats 
must first be found. Then a ‘contract on the exchange of flats’ must be agreed to by the owners of 
both flats. 
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owner of the flat with a price on the market highly exceeding the market price of its less 
lucky neighbour’s flat. If the less lucky household were to decide to buy the same flat on 
the free market, it would have to borrow 630,000 CZK from either the building savings 
bank or a mortgage bank. Monthly payment of the loan would be 8820 CZK2 in the case 
of a loan from a building savings bank, and 7647 CZK3 in the case of a mortgage bank, 
which would represent 54% (47%) of the total income of an average household. In prac-
tice, however, this less lucky family might not get either of the loans mentioned, as the 
average household income may not be enough to qualify for such loans.4 
Thus far all that has been said about the inequalities generated by the division of 
the housing market into different sectors has left aside the households living in rental flats 
with market rents. Such households are in the worst position, as they not only have noth-
ing to capitalise, but their housing expenditures could also be substantially higher than the 
average for the population. As Vajdová and Buštíková [1998] show, these households do 
not substantially differ from the average Czech household in any characteristic, except 
that of the age of the household members. In fact, the key characteristic is that these are 
new households, established under the new conditions of the housing market. There are 
several possible ways by which newly established households can get their own, separate 
housing: they may receive or inherit some sort of housing from parents or relatives; they 
may buy or build some flat or house; or they may rent it out of the free market. Although 
the last option is open to everyone, including those without any property, the ‘dark side’ 
of this possibility is the necessity of paying market rent. This may cause considerably 
higher housing expenditures for these households than for those living in flats with regu-
lated rent (see next table). 
                                                     
2) Under the following conditions: the family already saved another 630,000 CZK and has it in its 
account for down payment, the monthly payment is set up to 0.14% of borrowed 630,000 CZK, 
the loan is to be paid back within 10 years, the state subsidy applied, no tax deductions applied. 
3) Under the following conditions: the family already has 270,000 CZK for down payment, the 
interest rate is 14%, the loan is to be paid back within 20 years, no state subsidy and no tax deduc-
tions applied. 
4) It depends on the number of family members and their age, as banks take into account the 
minimum standard of living of the applicant’s family. While the average income of a family with-
out children would qualify, that of a family with two children would definitely not. 
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Table 5. Housing expenditures* in flats with market rent, in flats with regulated** rent and in 
flats bought on loan*** and their relation to incomes of an average local household 
living in 77 m2 flat in January 1st 1997 by region 
 Housing expenditures (CZK/m2) Housing expenditures/Total income (%) 
Region Free market Regulated On loan Free market Regulated On loan 
Praha 193 32 135 91 15 64 
Central Bohemia 99 28 81 54 15 44 
České Budějovice 90 30 72 49 16 39 
Plzeň 96 30 82 53 16 45 
Karlovy Vary 94 28 74 56 17 44 
Ústi nad Labem 66 30 43 37 17 24 
Liberec 87 30 69 50 17 39 
Hradec Králové 92 28 79 50 15 43 
Pardubice 75 28 83 43 16 48 
Jihlava 75 28 76 42 15 42 
Brno 99 30 86 54 16 47 
Olomouc 67 30 76 38 17 44 
Ostrava 57 30 51 33 17 30 
Zlín 94 28 83 52 15 46 
*) Housing expenditures include rent + utilities (mortgage payment + utilities in the case of flat 
ownership). Costs of utilities were estimated at 20 CZK per m2 monthly. 
**) The highest possible regulated rent in each region was considered, which refers to the situation 
in the biggest cities in respective regions. In reality, average regulated rents in regions outside 
Prague were slightly smaller than in the table, due to lower rents in smaller cities. 
***) Loans from a building savings bank under the following conditions: 50% down payment is 
already saved and deposited in the bank account, monthly payment is set up at 0.14% of the bor-
rowed amount, the loan is to be paid back within 10 years, state subsidy applied, no tax deductions 
applied. 
Source: [Šetření… 1996, “Vyhláška…” 1993, Statistika… 1997]. 
 
Two remarkable differences between rental sectors with regulated and free-market rents 
are obvious. The first is that while the level of housing expenditures (in relation to in-
comes) in flats with market rents vary highly from region to region, there were almost no 
regional differences in the cost of living in flats with regulated rents. The second is that 
housing expenditures in flats with market rents were much higher than in flats with regu-
lated rents. Living in a flat with a market rent could mean paying twice as much (Ostrava 
region) or even six times more (Prague) than when living in a flat of the same size and 
quality with regulated rent. Moreover, the high housing expenditures of average house-
holds living in rental flats with free market rent radically reduce the chances of saving 
money from their budget and avoiding paying high rents by buying their own flat. 
Why do households simply not borrow money from banks, and then pay monthly 
instalments, particularly when the figures in the table suggest that it could even be 
cheaper than renting on the free market? There are several serious obstacles to such 
household behaviour. The income of many households is too low to qualify for a housing 
loan. The criteria of the banks usually require that, after payment of the monthly mort-
gage instalment and all other debts, there is at least a 1.5 multiple of the living minimum 
remaining at the disposal of the household applying. Provided that the household apply-
ing consists of two adults with one child under than 6 years old, the 1.5 multiple of the 
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living minimum equalled 7875 CZK per month (in January 1st 1997). The bottom quarter 
of households in the income hierarchy, however, had no such income at that time 
[Příjmový… 1998], and were automatically excluded from taking out any loan for hous-
ing. The households with a median income would be able to afford a loan of about 
300,000 CZK (if they had another 300,000 CZK already saved for down payment). To-
gether (600,000 CZK) it could be enough to buy a large luxury flat in some regions (Ústí 
nad Labem, Ostrava…), a reasonably large flat in most other regions, but only a very 
small flat in Prague. The problem is that among households with housing needs, young 
couples with a child or children are heavily over-represented. Such households, however, 
usually rank among the poorer ones [Večerník 1997]. Moreover, many potential loan 
holders simply do not have enough money saved to pay the down payment. 
The last but by no means the least obstacle to receiving a loan is the problem of 
debt guarantee. To be sure that the loans are secure, banks require a debt guarantee from 
applicants, the value of which must be at least about 25% higher than the amount of the 
intended loan. Such a guarantee could be savings, shares or other valuables, or – most 
commonly – real estate (flats, houses, building lots). But practically none of the appli-
cants seeking housing have either of the above mentioned possibilities. If they had, they 
would not have housing problems, but would simply buy a flat without any loans. The 
critical point is that applicants cannot offer as a guarantee the flat they intend to buy using 
the borrowed money, because they do not possess it at the time their application is proc-
essed. There is a theoretical possibility that the seller will be willing to wait for the 
money: just selling the flat after gaining part of the money, transferring legal ownership 
rights to the buyer, letting the buyer go through the loan procedure, and then receiving the 
rest of the money afterwards. In practice, however, almost no seller is willing to sell a flat 
this way, as it is a risky procedure, which could take several months to be completed. 
Buyers, on the other hands, are in a tricky position: They cannot borrow money before 
buying a flat, and they cannot buy a flat before borrowing the money. Thus the only ap-
plicable solution remains to persuade friends, parents or other relatives (if any have valu-
able property) to offer their real estate as a guarantee for the bank. This condition 
apparently further reduces the number of qualified applicants, as such guarantors may be 
hard to find. 
Conclusions 
The housing market in the post-communist Czech Republic is not a single market with 
uniform rules of operation, but rather a mosaic consisting of different sectors and regional 
sub-markets that to a high extent function autonomously. No matter how it has come 
about that different households have found themselves in a different part of the ‘mosaic’, 
their housing situation must be taken into account when thinking about social inequali-
ties. It is evident that the position of the households in the housing market does not sim-
ply reflect the differences in household incomes. The relation between housing 
inequalities and social inequalities is complex. In many cases, the housing situation of 
households is directly influenced by property value, the structure of incomes, and expen-
ditures. Thus the differences in housing may also be an important source of social ine-
qualities in general. 
The way the housing market has developed in the course of the economic trans-
formation favoured some groups while disfavouring others. The regionally unequal in-
crease of prices benefited the owners of real state located in the areas evaluated by the 
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market as the most attractive (Prague and its surroundings, regions of Brno, Plzeň, 
Zlín…). On the other hand, those who owned real estate in the least attractive regions 
(North-Western Bohemia, Ostrava region…) were relatively disadvantaged. As far as the 
division of the housing market into segments is concerned, the ‘winners’ were private flat 
owners, members of housing co-operatives, and those who had a chance to buy a munici-
pal flat for prices below the market price. The relative ‘losers’ were those who found 
themselves in the position of tenant in privately owned houses. But the most apparent 
‘losers’ were those who simply had no flat to live in, and were pressed to rent a flat out of 
the free market, particularly in more expensive regions. They not only had to pay substan-
tially more for the same as what others are paying for, but furthermore, they were often 
not considered as being poor, as state social policies are based on income testing (the 
poor are those who have a low income), and do not take into consideration the housing 
situation. 
Finally, it should be taken into account that ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ are to some ex-
tent relative categories. As the laws and other rules regulating the housing market change 
rather frequently, the situation of different groups can also change substantially. Even the 
development in the housing market, which is driven by ‘pure market forces’, is far from 
stable, and what may look like an advantage at one time may not be advantage later. Re-
gardless of the scope of uncertainty connected with the development of the housing mar-
ket, we believe that any attempt to incorporate the problems of housing into the research 
of the development of the social structure is worthwhile. 
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